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INTRODUCTION

In November of 2014, Tennessee voters adopted the following
amendment to the Tennessee constitution:
Nothing in this Constitution secures or protects a right to
abortion or requires the funding of an abortion. The people
retain the right through their elected state representatives
and state senators to enact, amend, or repeal statutes
regarding abortion,
including, but not limited to,
circumstances of pregnancy resulting from rape or incest or
when necessary to save the life of the mother.'
This amendment was a popular response to the Tennessee
Supreme Court's ruling in Planned Parenthoodof Middle Tennessee
v. Sundquist,2 which established a right to abortion under the
Tennessee constitution-a right somewhat broader than that found
by the United States Supreme Court under the United States
Constitution.
The impact of the new language on abortion appears largely
straightforward: shifting control of the issue from the Tennessee
Supreme Court to the General Assembly. But its adoption raises a
related question. The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee came at the end of a
lengthy series of decisions concerning the Tennessee constitution's
right of privacy, which addressed such topics as parental rights to

* Beauchamp
Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to Kateri Dahl for helpful research on this piece.
1. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 36. The proposed state constitutional amendment
appeared as "Amendment 1" on the ballot. Tennessee Legislative Powers Regarding
Abortion, Amendment 1 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Tennessee
Legislative Powers Regarding.Abortion,_Amendment 1_%282014%29.
2. 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000).
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frozen embryos, the power of the state to pass laws criminalizing
homosexual sodomy, grandparent visitation rights, and even the
possession of guns in the parental home. The treatment of abortion
in Planned Parenthoodof Middle Tennessee was not a departure, but
was instead the logical outgrowth of these earlier cases. But with
that decision removed, do the earlier cases retain their authority? Or
does the "penumbra" of this new amendment to the Tennessee
constitution call those decisions into question as well?
In the pages that follow, I will briefly revisit those earlier
decisions, review the adoption of this new amendment, and then
discuss what impact-if any-this change has on Tennessee courts'
earlier jurisprudence of privacy, procreation, and parenting.
I. PRIVACY AND THE TENNESSEE CONSTITUTION

Like the United States Constitution, and unlike the constitutions
of some other states, Tennessee's constitution does not contain
language explicitly protecting the right of privacy. However, as in
many other states, Tennessee courts have interpreted certain
provisions of the Tennessee constitution, acting together, to protect a
right of privacy and personal autonomy in areas relating to
parenting, procreation, and sex.
The first such case-though not the first Tennessee case to
mention a right of privacy-was the Davis v. Davis frozen embryo
case. 3 The Davises were a married couple, suffering from fertility
problems, who entered into efforts to conceive a child using in vitro
fertilization ("IVF").4 The efforts were not successful, and the
marriage disintegrated into divorce with several frozen embryos
remaining.5 During the divorce proceedings, the wife, Mary Sue
Davis, sought custody of the remaining frozen embryos.6 The
husband, Junior Davis, disputed this, arguing that he did not want
to be a father outside of a loving, committed marriage.7
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that rights to procreate and
not to procreate are equally protected by a right of privacy derived
from several provisions of the Tennessee constitution:
[I]t is not surprising that in the Tennessee Constitution, the
concept of liberty plays a central role. Article I, Section 8
provides:

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized
of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled,
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or
property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land."
Indeed, the notion of individual liberty is so deeply
embedded in the Tennessee Constitution that it, alone among
American constitutions, gives the people, in the face of
governmental oppression and interference with liberty, the
right to resist that oppression even to the extent of
overthrowing the government. The relevant provisions
establishing this distinctive political autonomy appear in the
first two sections of Article I of the Tennessee Constitution,
its Declaration of Rights:
Section 1. All power inherent in the peopleGovernment under their control.
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free
governments are founded on their authority, and
instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for
the advancement of those ends they have at all times,
an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform,
or abolish the government in such manner as they
may think proper.
Section 2. Doctrine of nonresistancecondemned.
That government being instituted for the common
benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against
arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish,
and destructive of the good and happiness of
mankind.
The right to privacy, or personal autonomy ("the right to be
let alone"), while not mentioned explicitly in our state
constitution, is nevertheless reflected in several sections of
the Tennessee Declaration of Rights, including provisions in
Section 3 guaranteeing freedom of worship ("no human
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with
the rights of conscience"); those in Section 7 prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures ("the people shall be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
unreasonable searches and seizures"); those in Section 19
guaranteeing freedom of speech and press ("free
communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the
invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak,
write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty"); and the provisions in Section 27
regulating the quartering of soldiers ("no soldier shall, in
time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent
of the owner").
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Obviously, the drafters of the Tennessee Constitution of
1796 could not have anticipated the need to construe the
liberty clauses of that document in terms of the choices
flowing from in vitro fertilization procedures. But there can
be little doubt that they foresaw the need to protect
individuals from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters such as the one now before us, involving intimate
questions of personal and family concern. Based on both the
language and the development of our state constitution, we
have no hesitation in drawing the conclusion that there is a
right of individual privacy guaranteed under and protected
by the liberty clauses of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights.
Undoubtedly, that right to privacy incorporates some of
the attributes of the federal constitutional right to privacy
and, in any given fact situation, may also share some of its
contours. As with other state constitutional rights having
counterparts in the federal bill of rights, however, there is no
reason to assume that there is a complete congruency. 8
Because the Court held that the right to procreate and the right
to choose not to procreate are equally protected, 9 the Davis court
ruled in favor of Junior Davis, leaving Mary Sue free to procreate in
such independent fashion as she chose. 10
A few years later, in Campbell v. Sundquist, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals, applying the right of privacy found in Davis, found
Tennessee's Homosexual Practices Act to violate the Tennessee
constitution." Though the state offered a number of justifications for
the Act-ranging from prevention of disease to advancing the moral
interests of the people of Tennessee 19-the Court of Appeals was
unpersuaded, writing:
As stated above, the appellants argue that the "precise
source" of the right to privacy is Article I, Section 8 of the
Tennessee Constitution, and that since Tennessee courts
have interpreted Article I, Section 8 "synonymously" with the
Federal Due Process Clauses, the right to privacy in
Tennessee does not encompass the right to engage in
homosexual conduct. We disagree. Our Supreme Court has
not stated that Article I, Section 8 is the precise source of the
right to privacy, it has stated that the right to privacy is
"ground[ed]" in the "concept of liberty" in our Constitution.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 599-600 (alterations in original).
Id. at 601.
Id. at 604.
926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 262.

2015]

THE FUTURE OF PROCREATIONAL RIGHTS

73

Article I, Section 8's "liberty" provision is certainly part of
that "concept of liberty," and it protects and guarantees the
right to privacy, but it is not the sole and precise source of
the right to privacy. The Davis Court clearly stated that the
textual sources of the right to privacy include Sections 3, 7,
19, and 27 of the Declaration of Rights contained in Article I.
Thus, the construction which the Supreme Court has placed
on Article I, Section 8 does not restrict the right to privacy,
because the right to privacy does not stem solely from Article
I, Section 8. Moreover, the cases which the appellants have
cited for the proposition that Article I, Section 8 is
"synonymous" with the Due Process Clauses of the Federal
Constitution overstate the holdings of these cases. These
cases state that the "law of the land" provision of Article I,
Section 8 is "synonymous" with the Federal Due Process
Clauses; the Courts did not purport to discuss the "liberty"
component of the Section in the context of the right to
privacy. In any event, Davis v. Davis clearly established that
"there is no reason to assume that there is a complete
congruency" between the Tennessee and the federal right to
privacy.
Both the Tennessee Constitution and this State's
constitutional jurisprudence establish that the right to
privacy provided to Tennesseans under our Constitution is in
fact more extensive than the corresponding right to privacy
provided by the Federal Constitution. We agree with the
plaintiffs that the Tennessee Constitution and especially the
Declaration of Rights in Article I, indicate a strong historic
commitment by the citizens of this State to individual liberty
and freedom from governmental interference in their
personal lives. Our Supreme Court noted this commitment in
Davis.13
This right of freedom from governmental interference in personal
lives was not limited to matters pertaining to sex and procreation. In
Hawk v. Hawk, the Tennessee Supreme Court struck down a
grandparent-visitation statute on the ground that it was an
unconstitutional interference with the right of fit parents to raise
their children as they choose. 14 The Court held:
Tennessee's historically strong protection of parental rights
and the reasoning of federal constitutional cases convince us
that parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest
under Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. In

13. Id. at 260-61 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
14. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
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Davis v. Davis, we recognized that although "[t]he right to
privacy is not specifically mentioned in either the federal or
the Tennessee state constitution,

. .

. there can be little doubt

about its grounding in the concept of liberty reflected in those
two documents." We explained that "the notion of individual
liberty is . . . deeply embedded in the Tennessee Constitution
. . . ," and we explicitly found that "[t]he right to privacy, or

personal autonomy ('the right to be let alone'), while not
mentioned explicitly in our state constitution, is nevertheless
reflected in several sections of the Tennessee Declaration of
Rights .

. ."

Citing a wealth of rights that protect personal

privacy, rights such as the freedom of worship, freedom of
speech, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and the regulation of the quartering of soldiers, we had "no
hesitation in drawing the conclusion that there is a right of
individual privacy guaranteed under and protected by the
liberty clauses of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights."
Finding the right to procreational autonomy to be part of this
right to privacy, we noted that the right to procreational
autonomy is evidence by the same concepts that uphold
"parental rights and responsibilities with respect to
children." Thus, we conclude that the same right to privacy
espoused in Davis fully protects the right of parents to care
for their children without unwarranted state intervention. 15
And in Stillwell v. Stillwell,16 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
combined the parental rights protected under Hawk v. Hawk with
the right to keep and bear arms under article I, section 26 of the
Tennessee constitution to strike down a visitation order prohibiting
a father from possessing firearms when his son was visiting. 7 The
Court of Appeals explicitly noted the applicability of both the right to
bear arms and parental privacy rights.18
II. ABORTION UNDER THE TENNESSEE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The Tennessee Supreme Court applied Tennessee's right of
privacy to abortion in Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v.
Sundquist.19 The Tennessee Court of Appeals evaluated Tennessee

15. Id. at 579 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
16. Stillwell v. Stillwell, No. E3001-00245-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 862620 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 30, 2001).
17. Id. at *3.
18. Id.; see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Guns and Gay Sex: Some Notes on
Firearms, The Second Amendment, and "Reasonable Regulation," 75 TENN. L. REV.
137, 142-43 (2007) (describing Stillwell).
19. 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000).
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abortion statutes requiring waiting periods, informed consent, and
medical facility approvals 20 under the Federal Constitution's "undue
burden" standard established by the United States Supreme Court
in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey.2 1
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that although
the Federal Constitution's right of privacy had been held to create
only an "undue burden" standard, the right of privacy under the
Tennessee constitution required a stronger "strict scrutiny" test for
restrictions upon the availability of abortion. 22 The Tennessee
Supreme Court reasoned:
Since the Davis decision, we have identified privacy rights in
other contexts. We have held that a parent's right to the
custody of his or her child implicates a fundamental right of
privacy and may not be abridged absent a compelling state
interest. The Court of Appeals has relied upon Davis to find a
privacy interest in consensual adult homosexuality. There is
no exhaustive list of activities that fall under the protection
of the right to privacy, at either the federal or state level.
However, it is clear that such activities must be of the utmost
personal and intimate concern. We observe that expressly
limiting the substantive scope of the interests comprising the
right of privacy serves no helpful purpose, is indeed
impossible, and is best left to constitutional amendment or
interpretation of individual cases. Our task here is to
determine whether the interest asserted in this case
constitutes a cognizable privacy interest. We hold that a
woman's right to obtain a legal termination of her pregnancy
is sufficiently similar in character to those personal and
private decisions and activities identified in state and federal
precedent to implicate a cognizable privacy interest.23
Next, the court concluded that the right was a fundamental one,
and thus entitled to strict scrutiny:
[I]n Davis, we found the right to procreational autonomy to
be "inherent in our most basic concepts of liberty." That test
was essentially a restatement of the fundamental rights
approach of Roe. Because a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy and an individual's right to procreational
autonomy are similar in nature, we find the Davis test to be
most appropriate here. Thus, a woman's right to terminate

20. Id. at 3.
21. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d at 16.
23. Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
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her pregnancy is fundamental if it can be said to be inherent
in the concept of ordered liberty embodied in the Tennessee
Constitution.
Our constitution also contains specific provisions not
found in the federal constitution, the most pertinent being
Article 1, section 2, condemning the doctrine of
nonresistance. This provision exemplifies the strong and
unique concept of liberty embodied in our constitution in that
it "clearly assert[s] the right of revolution." It provides: "That
government being instituted for the common benefit, the
doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power and
oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and
happiness of mankind." In essence, this section recognizes
that our government serves at the will of the people of
Tennessee, and expressly advocates active resistance against
the government when the government no longer functions to
serve the people's needs. There is no better statement of our
constitution's concept of liberty than this audacious
empowerment of Tennesseans to forcibly dissolve the very
government established but one Article later in our
constitution. 24
Holding that "the undue burden approach is essentially no
standard at all," 2 5 the court applied strict scrutiny:
Application of strict scrutiny, a recognized principle of
constitutional law, on the other hand, requires the Court to
apply a standard that has been applied repeatedly over the
years, and the Court may draw upon that precedent in
determining whether the legislation passes muster.26
Thus, the Casey test offers our judges no real guidance
and engenders no expectation among the citizenry that
governmental regulation of abortion will be objective,
evenhanded, or well-reasoned. This Court finds no
justification
for
exchanging
the
long-established
constitutional doctrine of strict scrutiny for a test, not yet ten
years old and applicable to a single, narrow area of the law,
that would relegate a fundamental right of the citizens of
Tennessee to the personal caprice of an individual judge. 27

24.

Id. at 12, 14 (citations omitted).

25.
26.
27.

Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
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Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that the restrictions
involved failed to pass muster. 28 The upshot of Planned Parenthood
of Middle Tennessee, then, was that in Tennessee restrictions on
abortion would henceforth be evaluated under a stricter state
constitutional standard (strict scrutiny) rather than under the more
forgiving federal undue burden standard.
In fact, that is how Tennessee courts have approached the
matter. In Tennessee Department of Health v. Boyle, 29 the Tennessee
Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny analysis to a law
designating facilities--other than doctors' and (strangely) dentists'
offices-where abortions are performed as Ambulatory Surgery
Treatment Centers, subjecting them to a substantial degree of
regulation.3 0 Finding the law was not narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling government interest, the Court of Appeals overturned the
law on the authority of Planned Parenthoodof Middle Tennessee v.
Sundquist.3 1

III. CONSEQUENCES

After Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist,
Tennessee had a right to abortion that was stronger than that
protected under the Federal Constitution post-Casey and-because it
was rooted independently in the Tennessee constitution-that
protection would survive even if the U.S. Supreme Court overruled
the Roe/Casey line of cases and found no federal constitutional right
to abortion. As the Tennessee Supreme Court itself noted in that
case, the delineation of privacy rights is best determined either by
judicial decision or constitutional amendment. 32 The Court created
the right by the former; the voters responded via the latter:
Nothing in this Constitution secures or protects a right to
abortion or requires the funding of an abortion. The people
retain the right through their elected state representatives
and state senators to enact, amend, or repeal statutes
regarding abortion, including, but not limited to,

28. Id. at 25.
29. Tennessee Dep't of Health v. Boyle, No. M2001-017380COA-R3-CV, 2002
WL 31840685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002).
30. Id. at *1 (discussing that doctors' and dentists' offices were only so
designated if they performed a "substantial number" of abortions).
31. Id. at *8.
32. See Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 11
(Tenn. 2000).
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circumstances of pregnancy resulting from rape or incest or
when necessary to save the life of the mother.3 3
With the adoption of this amendment, the decision in Planned
Parenthood of Middle Tennessee was effectively overruled, and the
power of the Tennessee Supreme Court to recognize a right to
abortion under the Tennessee constitution was removed. In the
future-rights protected under the Federal Constitution aside, of
course-any such rights will exist only as a product of legislation
passed by the Tennessee General Assembly. The practical impact of
this change, absent a change in federal law, is likely to be small
because the opinion in Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee
suggested that most of the abortion restrictions overturned under
strict scrutiny would have also been overturned under the federal
"undue burden" test. 34 But, after this Amendment, abortion rights in
Tennessee are entirely creatures of federal constitutional law.
Nonetheless, Tennessee courts will continue to hear cases
involving the Tennessee constitution's right of privacy, which raises
the question of whether Tennessee's right of privacy remains now
that the opinion in Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v.
Sundquist is no longer operative. The answer appears to be yes.
There are two reasons why the Tennessee abortion amendment does
not affect the right of privacy in other settings. One reason lies in
the amendment itself, while the other lies in the roots of the
Tennessee right of privacy.
The amendment itself, of course, speaks only of abortion. By its
terms, it affects nothing else. The question is, does it have
penumbral effects? Though I yield to few in my cordiality toward
penumbral reasoning, 35 the extremely focused and specific language
of this provision does not lend itself to such. It is specifically about
abortion and about the transfer of power over abortion from the
Tennessee Supreme Court to the Tennessee General Assembly; it
contains nothing at all in the way of generalities.
There is no mention of the Tennessee right of privacy in any
other context, though the drafters, of course, must have been
entirely familiar with the right and with the cases developing that
right. Under the principle of expressio unius, this omission suggests
that there was no intent on the part of the drafters to reach anything

33.

See supra note 1.

34.

See Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d at 22-24.

35. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably
Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REv. 1089 (1998) (describing penumbral reasoning in various
settings as a legitimate, and even necessary, interpretive technique); Glenn H.

Reynolds, PenumbralReasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333 (1992).
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beyond abortion itself. That principle is underscored by established
Tennessee case law regarding the interpretation of the Tennessee
constitution. As the Tennessee Supreme Court remarked in Gaskin
v. Collins, "We must also give effect to the intent of the people who
adopt a constitutional provision, and their intent should be derived
from the language as it is found in the instrument."3 6 Likewise, in
Hatcher v. Bell, the Tennessee Supreme court observed:
The fundamental purpose in construing a constitutional
provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and
purpose of those who adopted it. And if the language used is
clear and unambiguous, the meaning and intent of the
provision is to be ascertained from the instrument itself by
construing the language as it is written.3 7
Although, as lawyers, all of us are capable of finding ambiguity
in any phrase-at least for a sufficient fee-the language in the
Tennessee abortion amendment seems straightforward and not the
least bit ambiguous. The amendment states clearly that there is no
right to abortion under the Tennessee constitution, and that
decisions regarding the legal status of abortion are to be made, if at
all, by the General Assembly.
Furthermore, the Tennessee right of privacy, being rooted in
other provisions not mentioned in this amendment, has its own
constitutional footing. It is another principle of Tennessee
constitutional interpretation that "[tihe whole instrument must be
taken into consideration, and no part so construed so as to impair or
destroy any other part. Legislative powers enumerated in one clause
must be defined and exercised with reference to limitations and
requirements made in other clauses."3 8 Limiting the reach of those
provisions that support the right of privacy, without explicit
authority, would "impair or destroy" the reach of those provisions
and thus would be inappropriate.

36. 661 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tenn. 1983) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
37. 521 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tenn. 1974) (citations omitted); see also Cocke v.
Gooch, 52 Tenn. 294, 309-10 (1871) ("The object of construction as applied to a
written Constitution is to give effect to the intent of the people adopting it. In the
case of all laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to be enforced. But this intent
is to be found in the instrument itself. It is to be presumed that language has been
employed with sufficient precision to convey it, and unless examination
demonstrates that the presumption does not hold good in the particular case, nothing
will remain except to enforce it. . . . Possible or even probable meanings, when one is
plainly declared in the instrument itself, the Courts are not at liberty to search for
elsewhere.").
38. State v. Memphis City Bank, 19 S.W. 1045, 1048 (Tenn. 1892).
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Speaking as an academic, the conclusion is, therefore,
unsatisfactorily clear and obvious. The Tennessee abortion
amendment does exactly what it says: no more and no less. It would
have been a far greater triumph of scholarship to have demonstrated
that the amendment, despite its clear language, actually did far
more, or far less, than appeared on its face. Such a triumph,
however, would be unsupported by the law.
Yet there are some larger lessons here that concern the role of
judicial review in a world of written constitutions and popular
sovereignty. As the Tennessee Supreme Court itself said in
Sundquist, "constitutional amendment" was one means of
delineating the limits of privacy rights under the Tennessee
constitution.39 That the public chose that means is, of course, a
rebuke of sorts to the Tennessee Supreme Court's reasoning on
privacy and abortion.
But, as Charles Black has noted with regard to the Federal
Constitution, the possibility of popular action to overturn decisions
of the judiciary also has a legitimating function. If the public canand does-impose limits on how far the judiciary may go, then it also
follows that where the public remains quiescent, the judiciary is
presumptively acting within bounds, adding to the legitimacy of its
actions.
As a matter of drafting, it would have been easy enough to come
up with a proposed amendment eliminating the right of privacy
under the Tennessee constitution entirely or even an amendment
providing that the Tennessee Supreme Court could not recognize any
rights not specifically enumerated therein. The drafters did not do
that, either because they had no desire to accomplish that end or
because they suspected (probably rightly) that such sweeping
language would be much less likely to attract the necessary level of
popular support. Either way, the implication is that the right of
privacy is acceptable to the people of Tennessee-in contexts other
than abortion.
The amendment also answers a criticism of Justice Antonin
Scalia in the case of Lawrence v. Texas.4 0 In his Lawrence dissent,
Scalia commented that some issues are more amenable to political
than judicial resolution because "the people, unlike judges, need not
carry things to their logical conclusion." 41 It may have seemed-in
fact, it pretty clearly did seem-to the Tennessee Supreme Court
that the logic behind the Tennessee right of privacy applied in the

39.

See Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d at 11.

40. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
41. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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context of abortion. The people, however, were able to provide
otherwise, establishing that as-however logical-a conclusion too
far. What this suggests, then, is that where the people have not
provided otherwise, the Tennessee Supreme Court is (probably) on
solid ground.
CONCLUSION

Law review articles are more often written about judicial
opinions than about constitutional amendments. In part, as this
discussion has made clear, that is because judicial opinions give us
more to work with: lengthy writings, concurrences and dissents,
arguments of the parties, opinions of lower courts, and so on. And, of
course, to the delight of law professors everywhere, judicial opinions
are easy to include in casebooks.
Constitutional amendments, on the other hand, offer less grist
for the scholarly mill. Though the people may speak clearly, they do
not do so at length. There is no explanation for the people's
reasoning beyond the measure they adopt and the obvious inferences
it supports. There is no concurring opinion to suggest alternate
grounds and no dissent to explain why the whole thing is wrong and
should come out differently next time. Nonetheless, the amendment
process is as much a part of constitutional law, and constitutional
interpretation, as any judicial opinion. The people, after all, have a
role to play in the interpretive process too.

